

10 April 1968

1. The various studies and recommendations on the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency, starting with that of General Donovan in 1944, stress the need for objectivity and continuity in carrying out the functions of the Agency. One of the factors which concerned the early advocates of a centralized intelligence service was the tenure of office for the Director. The Lovett Committee report of 5 November 1945, which was one of the most influential papers in the development of the central intelligence theory, recommended that the Director be appointed for a six year term. In early drafts of the legislation which was finally incorporated into the National Security Act of 1947, a fifteen year term, parallel to that of the Comptroller General, for Director was provided for. The Director under that suggestion could have been removed during that term only by a joint resolution of Congress. The idea of a long-term appointment for the Director was finally dropped for several reasons, one of which was that there was no precedent for such a term for a comparable position in the Executive Branch.

2. In the floor debate on the National Security Act, Mr. Judd, after quoting Mr. Dulles' testimony that the man who became Director ought to go into it as a man who goes into a monastery stated "He ought to take it as J. Edgar Hoover has taken the FBI job. Make it his lifes work. He certainly ought to be cut completely loose from any ties or responsibility or connections with any other branch of the Government - civil or military - except the President and the National Security Council." Mr. Mc Cormack added "but what is permanency, unless it is appointment for life, with removal as provided for in the case of judges? We cannot give any man any assurance of permanency as far as an administrative position is concerned."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**CONFIDENTIAL**

3. In 1953 the Armed Services Committee of the House had hearings on the bill to authorize the appointment of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence at which Mr. Durham said "I am concerned about this organization functioning on a long-time basis." Later he added "Basically intelligence can't be operated on a hand to mouth basis like we have been trying to operate here since we set it up." Mr. Price said "I think it contributes to the weakness of the organization, the frequent turnover in Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency", to which the chairman replied "But I think it should be flexible and elastic and certainly should hold accordingly to the views and the will of the President."

4. In the Congressional investigation at the outbreak of the Korean War it was accepted that the role of the Central Intelligence Agency was to furnish completely objective and evaluated intelligence, but not to advocate policies or programs in connection therewith. However, the Director has a function to recommend and advocate policies and programs in the field of coordination and conduct of intelligence activities to both the National Security Council and CIA's parent committees in the Congress.

**CONFIDENTIAL**